• The severe crisis we are currently experiencing has forced millions of people to work, study, inform themselves, and maintain social relationships online. Without digital connections, lockdowns would not have been possible or would have led to chaos and the collapse of the economy
• We need to leverage this reality in order to catch up with Italy's large gap with the rest of Europe in terms of digitisation of the economy and societies. The time to act is now. If we return to the status quo before the pandemic, we will have culpably missed an unrepeatable opportunity.
• After the necessary loss-relief measures for businesses and households, we need to think about revitalisation. The creation of a digitisation-friendly ecosystem, as defined in the documents of the European Commission, is the main instrument to foster economic growth. It is also the necessary complement to the other pillar for Europe's future, the Green New Deal.

• Digital technologies are having an enormous influence in all areas of our social, cultural and economic life. They are the pivot and the lever around which all the major strands of change and revolution running through our society are revolving. Moreover, the Covid-19 emergency has only exacerbated and brought to hitherto unthinkable consequences certain trends that we had been witnessing for some time. It is therefore important to understand, on the one hand, what the characteristics of these technologies are and, on the other, what impact they have and will have on our lives and the development of our society.
• These notes address three themes: firstly, the main characteristics of digital technologies; secondly, certain dynamics in our society that have emerged also and above all as a consequence of the Covid-19 emergency; and finally, the main repercussions on our society and, consequently, hypotheses for intervention strategies that public decision-makers and private actors must put in place.

JEL Classification:O33, O31, D73, D81.

Keywords: innovation, digital technology, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, data value chain, digital ecosystems, network infrastructure, smart working, automation, real-time, Covid-19.

• Europe arrived at the pandemic convalescent after the sovereign debt crisis. The narrative that had dominated during the management of the Greek crisis neglected the root causes of the financial crisis (excessive private debt and trade imbalances) by focusing on the 'fiscal sinners' apologue. This inspired crisis management policies and institutional reforms oriented towards increased control of public finances while ignoring other sources of imbalance. The 2012-13 recession, which only the Eurozone experienced, was the result of this questionable approach.
• The Covid-19 crisis represents an important qualitative leap. The EU has left behind past timidities to deal with the pandemic. The suspension of the Stability Pact and ECB purchases enabled states, in the front line of the pandemic, to support their economies and health systems. Looking further into the medium term, Europe took the baton with the Next Generation EU, a joint debt effort in the service of shared goals of economic recovery and transformation. The Recovery and Resilience Device is not yet a 'Hamiltonian moment' but could become one.
• The European institutions seem to have (finally!) accepted the fact that a monetary union needs risk-sharing mechanisms involving the public hand alongside the markets. Three areas seem to be crucial. First, the creation of a shared budgetary capacity. This should entail a reorganisation of the multiple old and new facilities into a single financing instrument for the member states; automatic mechanisms such as a European unemployment benefit should also be part of the package. Then, the aim should be to improve market stabilisation capabilities by completing the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. The third yard should revise the budgetary rules to make them less pro-cyclical and less hostile to public investment.

JEL Classification: F45, H11, H63, N24.

Keywords: risk sharing, Recovery Device, Eurozone, Next Generation EU, fiscal capacity.

• The economic crisis resulting from the Covid-19-related health emergency is the first global crisis after 2008 and is similar in severity of impact to the one following World War II. Although authorities and governments have acted promptly to try to contain the collateral economic damage, the impacts will be considerable for the economy and, consequently, also for banks.
• Expansionary monetary policy and the freeing up of capital resources for banks, combined with moratoria and state guarantees, provided immediate liquidity to companies. However, several studies confirm the need to increase their capitalisation.
• Italy has limited room for manoeuvre compared to other countries, since the possibility of intervention with fiscal measures must also take into account the accumulated stock of public debt and the already high tax burden. It would therefore be appropriate to proceed with targeted and simple tax incentives to stimulate the overcoming of some of the chronic weaknesses of the Italian production system and to encourage greater capitalisation of companies and their growth in size, by supporting capital increases, stock market listings and mergers, also by strengthening some already existing instruments. In addition to improving companies' ability to face the crisis in the coming years, greater capitalisation would lead to a reduction in their probability of default and thus a reduction in banks' RWA.

JEL Classification: E50, E51, E60, G21.

Keywords: Covid-19, banks, credit, enterprises, monetary policy.

• Global value chains appeared to be slowing down, partly physiologically, even before the pandemic.
• Compared to the financial crisis, value chains were a less significant channel of transmission of the shock and the sectors affected were different: Covid-19 also significantly damaged sectors less integrated in international production networks, in particular services.
• The Bank of Italy's survey of industrial and service companies shows the absence of widespread reshoring phenomena; on the contrary, internationalised companies seem to have suffered less from the effects of the crisis.

JEL Classification:F14, F23, F60.

Keywords: global value chains, Covid-19, reshoring, Italy.

• On average, European citizens derive significant economic benefits from the European Union and this is also true for the average citizen of each individual member state. Today, the coordinated response to the pandemic seems to have fuelled a renewed consensus for the EU institutions. In spite of this, the popularity of the continental integration project has seen better times, and was in sharp decline in the decade leading up to the pandemic.
• If globalisation increases the resources that a country can distribute among its citizens but their distribution leaves some worse off than before, these disadvantaged end up considering the openness to international trade as the cause of their misfortunes, even though it would be more accurate to identify the reason, if not in greed, then at least in the lack of foresight of the advantaged.
• Economic development often passes through the geographical concentration of economic activities and thus through a division of regions into more or less developed ones. This is also the case in Europe. The challenge is to ensure that the success of the most dynamic regions spreads to the less active ones. If this happens, economic development becomes inclusive and is able to enjoy broad popular acceptance.

JEL Classification: R12, F24, H5.

Keywords: inequality, regional gaps in the EU, international trade.

• The fiscal responses of European governments to the Covid-19 emergency have been impressive, also thanks to the suspension of the EU Stability Pact and the Temporary Framework on State Aid. The objectives of the fiscal measures can be summarised as follows: 1) to strengthen healthcare systems; 2) to preserve the productive fabric by preventing a temporary liquidity crisis from becoming a solvency crisis capable of reducing potential growth; 3) to safeguard households' disposable income to support aggregate demand.
• The article provides a comprehensive overview of discretionary measures taken in France, Germany and Italy, excluding tax expenditure related to automatic stabilisers. The main focus is on business measures, with reference to three aspects: the size of the measures, the type of instruments, and the implementation of the measures, with regard to both the amount disbursed and the timing whenever possible.
• These measures, their type and the effectiveness of their implementation, will have impacts not only on the immediate economic future but also - together with the Next Generation EU Plan - in the medium term for the European Union. On the one hand, the public debt accumulated by states will be a constraint for the future; on the other hand, the size and effectiveness of fiscal measures will be key variables for the competitiveness of companies and for the recovery in individual member states.

JEL Classification: E62, H81, H84, O57.

Keywords: Covid-19 emergency, fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus, liquidity, European comparison.

• The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the most important programme of the Next Generation EU (NG-EU) initiative, which was approved by the European Council in July 2020 and will be launched in mid-2021. NG-EU represents a positive break in the centralised fiscal policy of the European Union. Indeed, the initiative envisages resources of 750 billion that will be allocated to the member states and covered by the issuance of bonds by the Commission on behalf of the EU, which will - in effect - provide the multi-year budget as a guarantee. Moreover, the allocation of these huge resources among countries will aim to facilitate their convergence by favouring the most fragile economic systems most affected by the pandemic.
• The thesis of this paper is that the NG-EU and, in particular, the RRF offer a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Italy to overcome its crystallised 'bottlenecks', to return to growth through a path of sustainable development, and to bring its huge public debt under control. This opportunity will only be effectively exploited if the country is able to tackle three very challenging tasks: to prepare, by April 2021, the National Recovery and Resilience Plan that is the key to accessing the RRF; to focus that Plan on a set of reforms and investments truly capable of changing the country's inertia; and to adopt a governance of the Plan that allows all the Plan's essential points to be implemented on schedule (i.e. spending commitments to be completed by 2023 and projects to be implemented by 2026). These results will only be achieved by mobilising all the forces at Italy's disposal.

JEL Classification: E62, E45, E22.

Keywords: European Union, fiscal policy, investment and reform, sustainable development.

• The European Union's Cohesion Policies have a history of more than four decades, six decades if the Common Agricultural Policy is also considered. This paper analyses the impact of structural funds on regional economic growth in European countries, paying particular attention to the regions of Southern Italy.
• Using a database for the period 1980-2014, our analysis highlights: 1) a positive and significant impact of structural fund expenditure on regional growth, consistent with recent empirical literature; 2) a correlation between structural funds and sectoral change, underlining the relevance of these financial sources for stimulating productivity growth in the long run; and 3) a significant role of the public sector on the efficiency of structural fund utilisation.

JEL Classification: O40, R11, H54.

Keywords: structural funds, convergence, structural change.