• This issue brings together a number of contributions on manufacturing transformations and globalisation trajectories, with the aim of documenting the evolution of certain aspects and isolating critical elements.
• Distance and uncertainty are the metrics that redefine the terms of globalisation at this start of the twenties. The pandemic has laid bare the dense network of strategic dependencies created within global supply chains since at least the beginning of the century, just think of the pharmaceutical and IT sectors. In addition to the slowdowns and disruptions of production processes due to shortages of strategic materials or components, from 'rare earths' and semiconductors to certain active ingredients in pharmaceuticals, the pandemic has also plastically demonstrated the costs and risks of distance in terms of the vectors of globalisation, with the traffic jams and the explosion of freight and freight prices on a planetary scale.
• Instead, the Russian invasion of Ukraine brought another critical dimension of globalisation into full view, namely the international political consensus around the system of institutions and rules that have governed the world since at least 1990, and of which trade and production multilateralism was an integral part. To the uncertainty related to the technical management of distance (transport) and the strategic dependence along global production chains (shortage of components) that the pandemic has revealed, the war in Europe has added the uncertainty already latent for some time concerning the geopolitical conditions necessary to maintain an international trade order.
• In the background, as some of the essays in this volume highlight, a further critical issue emerges relating to the dependence on technology and skills that globalisation has induced in some cases and in some even developed regions of the planet, and which now contributes to the current rethinking. In fact, not only is the issue of scientific and technological competition at the centre of the articulated confrontation between the two main planetary powers, the United States and China, but the investment in skills determines the degree and quality of the participation of any country's enterprises in global value chains.

• The pandemic - and then the outbreak of war - marked the final demise of a historical phase in which the industrialised countries had turned the production problem into a trade problem, i.e. into the problem of making available the goods they demanded from time to time by simply buying them in some corner of the world.
• The redistribution of processing activities from the North to the South - which is the very essence of the emergence of global supply chains - had led to a general problem of managing so-called 'strategic' goods, the explosion of which now requires a rethinking of the very logic of supply chains - hitherto modelled exclusively on the dictates of global trade.
• At the company level, the perimeter of internalised activities must be redefined and the problem of the 'redundancy' of resources necessary to avert the risk of supply bottlenecks must be addressed (eliminating single-source dependence cases as far as possible). When considered at the system-country level, the issue translates into a shortening of supply networks through the reconstitution of a national or continental supply.
• Be that as it may, the development of supply chains in the 'emerging' world and in particular in the Asian region has never come to correspond - except in certain areas - to an actual dismantling of manufacturing in offshoring-oriented countries (including European ones), whose actual size has never come to invest a preponderant share of production.
• The point is that the absolute size of the activities outsourced by the more developed economies was sufficient to fuel the start of an industrialisation process in economies lagging behind first of all because of the modest - if not minimal - starting size of their industries.
• The problem of reindustrialisation in the North in areas where there are deficits today (and especially in Europe) arises in terms of the conscious construction of a long-term project. This is an extremely ambitious goal (supply chains are not 'transferred' from one country to another by putting factories on a ship, but are redeployed through gradual processes of differential growth), which cannot be imagined to be achieved through the simple action of market forces.
• In this context, the dissipation of the Globalisation Age, which - for better or worse - has been no less than a world order for almost forty years, leaves everyone orphaned of a strong reference from the point of view of the contextual conditions within which a policy can be pursued (and, more generally, of a horizon of meaning). The timing of the transition to a new global order - the possible image of which we do not yet have - appears to be completely undetermined.

JEL classification: F63, F68, L60, O25.
Keywords: globalisation, manufacturing, industrial policies, pandemic.

• Bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials, intermediate goods and freight started as pandemic-related supply disruptions in the context of strong demand due to the global economic recovery after the end of lockdowns. But they were exacerbated by attempts to increase precautionary stocks as part of 'lean' production networks. The impact was particularly strong for sectors upstream in supply chains, energy and certain commodities.
• The pandemic, and the resulting monetary and fiscal policy stimulus to avoid a deep recession, has further strained the supply of raw materials and intermediate goods. Strong demand exerted (and in some cases is still exerting) enormous pressure on limited supply, resulting in higher inflation and shortages of essential components for industrial processes through highly complex and often fragile supply chains.
• The Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens to disrupt energy supplies, particularly in Europe. More structurally, the war is triggering a profound reassessment of energy security and reliability criteria, further accelerating the 'ecological transition' from fossil fuels to renewable energy. In turn, this is exacerbating a pre-existing supply-demand imbalance for some of the metals needed for the technologies associated with this transition.
• The most plausible scenario is one in which economic growth slows due to shortages of raw materials and inputs, while inflation - while moderating somewhat - remains higher than the depressed levels of the 10-15 years before the pandemic. Solving this would require significant investment and a reconfiguration of production chains, but also avoid very restrictive economic policies for demand if inflation were to remain high due to supply-side problems.

JEL Classification: E31, E32, E65, F44, F60, Q02.
Keywords: commodities, production chains, supply-demand imbalances, inflation, energy, pandemic, geopolitics, ecological transition.

• The article makes use of primary data collected through a survey designed to investigate the location choices of Italian companies: the responses of 762 manufacturing companies made it possible to investigate the backshoring phenomenon as a whole, considering both production and supply relocation.
• The data collected indicate that production backshoring choices (total or partial) were implemented by 16.5% of the 121 companies that had transferred production abroad and could be implemented in the medium to long term (three to over five years) by a further 12% of these. The main motivation for offshoring production was the reduction of labour costs, while backshoring was mainly driven by the reduction of delivery times and the improvement of the quality of services associated with the product.
• Approximately 75% of the total number of respondents purchased supplies totally or partially from foreign companies and 21.1% of these backshored supplies totally or partially. This strategy was implemented by companies of different size classes, geographical areas and sectors and was mainly driven by the availability of suitable suppliers in Italy. The backshoring of supplies is a strategy that has been adopted and can be adopted by companies throughout the country operating in various sectors and is therefore a phenomenon with great potential for growth.
• Statistical tests indicate significance in the relationship between manufacturing offshoring and supply backshoring and between manufacturing and supply backshoring: there is a positive association between manufacturing and supply backshoring, and the adoption of a supply backshoring strategy is not opposed to the choice of locating production abroad.
• Our results make it possible to provide some policy suggestions aimed not so much at directly promoting backshoring per se, but rather at increasing the attractiveness of our territories and the competitiveness of our companies by leveraging digitisation, sustainability and skill upgrading, so as to encourage both new investments and the spontaneous return of some companies that might re-evaluate their location choices in light of the transformations triggered by these policies.

JEL Classification: C83, F23, L23, M11.
Keywords: reshoring, backshoring, relocation, manufacturing sectors, Italy, survey, production organisation.

• The degree of trade openness of several emerging Asian countries, including China, India and Indonesia, has decreased significantly since 2005, both in terms of import and export propensity. This trend has contributed to the more general slowdown in world trade, relative to world output, that has become apparent since 2012 ('slow trade era').
• Contrary to what is often claimed, the degree of regionalisation of international trade, correctly measured, has decreased significantly over the last two decades, while trade between different regions, especially with East Asia, has maintained a higher relative intensity.
• The reduction in the degree of external openness of China and other emerging Asian countries manifests a trend towards greater internalisation of the international production networks in which they participate, reflecting profound changes in their development models, which are increasingly oriented towards rapidly growing domestic demand.

JEL Classification: F14, F15.
Keywords: international trade, trade regionalisation, international production networks, Asia.

• In the last twenty years, has world trade increased its regional component? This is the research question that has guided this work. In order to answer it in the most scientifically robust way possible, three indices have been used, which differ in their construction and in which the reference data base also changes.
• All three indicators thus constructed outline the same trend that characterised the regionalisation of trade from 1996 to 2020, identifying a turning point in 2004, the year of maximum regional trade expansion. From 2004 to 2012, an expansion of globalisation is observed. From 2012 to the present, trade regionalisation has undergone alternating phases, in which its strengthening has been followed by a more evident reduction.
• Considering the two components of the indicators, the geographical and the commodity ones, the results are not homogeneous and univocal. Europe is the macro-area with the highest index of regionalisation of foreign trade, North America the one in which the index has fluctuated the least, Asia the most globalised. Capital goods, which are also the most globalised, have shown a tendency towards regionalisation in the last period. Intermediate and consumer goods, which are the most regionalised, revealed, on the other hand, a trend towards regionalisation until 2004 and then, a subsequent globalisation until 2020. Heterogeneous dynamics are also observed for different types of intermediate goods.
• Analysing the effect of distance on trade between countries, an increase in the geographical extent of trade covered by regional trade agreements is observed, while the distance of trade between countries without agreements has remained broadly stable. Consequently, the increase in globalisation observed over the period is largely attributable to the increased length of the regional, or continental, dimension of trade. A gap remains for distances on an intercontinental scale, albeit somewhat reduced.

JEL Classification: F02, F14, F15, F18.
Keywords: international trade, trade regionalisation, statistical indicators.

• The value of e-commerce reached USD 26.6 trillion globally in 2019, equivalent to approximately 30% of global GDP. Measuring the impact of the digital economy is essential to understanding the economy as a whole, including internationally.
• International trade has been profoundly affected by the digital revolution and the weight of e-commerce in trade across national borders is growing. According to many studies, the use of digital technology is changing both how and what countries trade and is contributing to increasing competitiveness.
• Although digital transformation is opening up new markets and supporting a new wave of globalisation, it has also made international trade more complex, requiring companies to employ specific and new organisational capabilities. Moreover, the barriers and policies that influence the degree of openness and accessibility of a digital market are different from traditional barriers, and new types of flows such as cross-border data flows may raise new issues when referring to 'domestic protection'.
• The global digital market is still in the process of transformation and definition. While it offers considerable opportunities for growth, to function properly, like any other market, it needs shared operating rules between countries that are still being negotiated.

JEL Classification: F10, F13, F14.
Keywords: cross-border e-commerce, data flows, platforms, regulation.

• In this paper, we propose an analysis of the nature of policies in global value chains (GVCs) and a classification according to four different objectives: participation, value creation, inclusiveness and resilience. The focus on specialisation at the level of chain stages, linkages and relationships, and finally enterprises are the distinguishing factors that help explain how GVC-oriented policies differ conceptually from traditional policies.

JEL Classification: F23, L22, O10, O32, O38.
Keywords: global value chains, economic policy, participation, added value, inclusiveness, resilience.

• In an era characterised by radical changes in global economic and political arrangements and a marked return to the international scene of industrial policy as a strategic tool to promote the interest of nation states, reflecting on the role governments can play in economic and industrial dynamics is a priority.
• This contribution questions the role of industrial policy in the contemporary context by looking at the 'Chinese case'. It proposes a historical and current scenario re-reading of public intervention in production dynamics in China, in order to highlight its peculiarities, instruments and objectives. The aim is to analyse the actions implemented by one of the most important players in the global economy, capable of changing international economic, industrial and geopolitical balances.
• Understanding the dynamics of industrial development in our present and the different growth trajectories undertaken by international economies, perhaps today more than ever, requires looking at the Chinese reality, the challenges it faces, its expected strategic positioning in the general economic scenario, and the actions implemented to pursue its national objectives.

JEL Classification: L16, L52, L78, F50.
Keywords: China, industrial policy, economic development, structural change, innovation, supply-chain.